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GOVERNMENTAL AID TO CHURCH-AFFILIATED
COLLEGES AN ANALYSIS OF A POSSIBLE
ANSWER TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION
ROBERT P DAVIDOW*
In June, 1966, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided the
case of the Horace Mann League of the United States, Inc., v The
Board of Public Works of Maryland,1 in which it declared uncon-
stitutional, on the basis of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution 2 three acts of the Maryland legis-
lature which provided for direct grants of state funds to three
church-affiliated colleges for the purpose of aiding in the construc-
tion of a new dining hall, a new science wing to an old build-
ing, and two new science buildings. Three of seven justices dis-
sented from this view 3 In the same case, the Maryland court
upheld a similar grant to another church-affiliated college. Later
in the year, the United States Supreme Court refused to review
this decision,4 and, in so doing, it probably contributed more great-
ly to confusion than to clarity in an already confusing area of
the law
Any attempt at analysis naturally raises several questions,
among which may be the following: How broad is the Maryland
decision? If one assumes, arguendo, that the Maryland decision
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota, B. A. Dartmouth College.
1959 L.L. B. University of Michigan, 1962.
1. 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
2. The pertinent part of the First Amendment is as follows. "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
" The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment is as follows. " nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
3. Of the four justices who constituted the majority, two were special judges sitting
on the Court of Appeals because, as is indicated in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
(in fra, note 12.), two of the regular members of the Court of Appeals disqualified them-
selves for this cose.
4. The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by the Board of
Public Works, in which the Board asked the Court to overrule that portion of the Mary-
land decision whihi Invalidated three acts of the Maryland legislature. 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
The Suprnw (otrt also dismissed the appeal filed by the Horace Mann League of th,
United Stales 1, wichh the League sought reversal of that portion of the Maryland de-
cision which ulheld the legislative grant to Hood College, Ibid.
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is consistent with the views of the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, what effect is this decision likely to have on the
various federal programs of aid to church-affiliated colleges and
universities? Does the Maryland decision reflect the constitutional
views of a majority of the United States Supreme Court? Is the
Maryland decision constitutionally sound?
THE BREADTH OF THE MARYLAND DECISION
Since the Maryland court distinguished among church-affiliated
colleges in arriving at its decision, it becomes necessary to pay
particular attention to the facts which the court found relevant;
indeed, these facts are sufficiently important to justify the insertion
below of the court's own summarization of them:
According to the College Bulletin issued in 1963, Hood
is "an independent liberal arts college for women," and it
"is church related through its affiliation with the United
Church of Christ [U.C.C.], but welcomes students of all
religious faiths." It is listed in a Tabulation of the Danforth
Foundation of Institutions Associated with Religious Bodies
as "reflecting religious orientation." It is a small college,
limited to an enrollment of about 650 students, and is gov-
erned by a Board of Trustees consisting of 35 members.
Seven of these are elected by agencies of the U.C.C., 22 by
the Board itself; and 6 by the Alumnae Association from
its membership. The President is selected by the Board,
and the President, after screening by appropriate college
officials, selects the administrative personnel. Faculty mem-
bers are usually located by the chairman of the department
where a vacancy occurs. They are selected upon an analysis
of their academic credentials, qualifications, and earned
degrees, and their "character and congeniality " There are
no sectarian requirements for members of the faculty; the
President thought that Hood had "virtually all shades of
religious affiliations represented [thereon] and non-religious
affiliation." In the year 1963-64, there were 7 Episcopalians,
2 of the Jewish faith, 3 Lutherans, 6 Methodists, 1 with
no affiliation indicated, 13 Presbyterians, 2 listed as Protes-
tant but non-denominational, 5 Roman Catholics, 3 members
of the Society of Friends, 3 Unitarians, and 10 members
of the U.C.C., a rather heterogeneous faculty for a sectarian
school.
There is no requirement that any member of the officers
of administration be of any particular religious denomination,
and, in fact, the officers of administration do not represent
any particular church or religious body Included among
these are Baptists, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians,
one Roman Catholic and one Unitarian, and 7 members
of the U.C.C.
There is no requirement that the Chaplain, who super-
vises, generally, the religious lives of the student body be
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of any particular denomination, although the present one
is a member of the U.C.C.
The student body is primarily selected according to edu-
cational records supplied by the students and by the schools
from whence they come; there is absolutely no requirement
based on race, creed, color, or sectarian affiliation in the
student body An examination of their religious affiliation
for the year 1963-1964 shows such a diversification that it
would unduly prolong this opinion to include them all. Among
a student body of some 675 students, were included 146
Episcopalians, 29 Jewish students, 83 Methodists, 72 Roman
Catholics, 108 Presbyterians, and 89 members of the U.C.C.
The college confers only two earned degrees; the A.B.
degree, which is, of course, a liberal arts degree; and the
B.S. degree in Home Economics. It has a department of
religion and philosophy; the courses taught therein are con-
ducted in the same manner as the courses in other depart-
ments. These courses are not geared to aiding the Protestant
religions or any other; they are primarily historical studies
in religion and "there is absolutely no attempt at indoctrina-
tion in any way " The President was emphatic in stating
that he believed proselytizing had no place in higher edu-
cation. The professors in the religious field are not confined
to members of the U.C.C. or to Protestants. In addition,
there is no attempt by the U.C.C., or any other group, to
select texts or to offer suggestions as to which texts should
be used, and there are no courses in religion or philosophy,
or anywhere else in the cumculum, which are designed to
train for the ministry or religious work. The requirements
for attendance at chapel (indeed, if they may be termed
requirements from the evidence) do not call for frequent
services, with the student being allowed generous "cuts"
without excuse. On the Wednesday evening services, of which
there are approximately 15 per semester, clergymen of
various denominations come in and talk to the students.
These include Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jewish Rabbis,
and a Humanist (the President of Hood, after listening to
him, being unable to state what his religious preference
was) This same general pattern is followed for the Sunday
evening services, but not to the same extent as the services
on Wednesday evening. The students are encouraged to
maintain ties with the churches of their own denomination
while at the college, and each Sunday morning they are
released for the purpose of going to such churches in the
locality
In the year mentioned above, the U.C.C. contributed
2.2% of the college's total operating budget; but contributed
nothing In the way of capital gifts, with the exception of one
gift in the amount of $10,000 for endowed scholarships.
The college has a "very loose relationship" with the
Council for Higher Education of the U.C.C., all of the church-
related colleges related to the U.C.C. automatically becoming
members of the Council.
During the summers the college permits various civic
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and religious groups to utilize their campus for programs for
which modest charges are made. The school has no control
over the programs, and, as far as the record discloses,
the programs are not confined to church affairs or to any
particular denominations.
The facilities to be housed by the grant herein involved
will be a new academic building and a dormitory; no reli-
gious activities will be conducted therein.
The College's stated purposes in relation to religion are
not of a fervent, intense, or passionate nature, but seem
to be based largely upon its historical background. The
College was established in 1893, when a great number of
private schools were church-oriented, and it was then related
to the Reformed Church of the United States. After two
church mergers, one in 1933 and one in about 1962, the
present sponsoring church is the newly created U.C.C. The
Church does not have control over the governing body and
certainly the college personnel shows no serious attempt to
proselytize, or to require certain religious beliefs to become
a member thereof. The financial assistance of 2.2% of the
operating budget given by the Church is a moderate per-
centage. The only physical structure of a religious character
seems to be the Chapel, and it is open to all. Religion in
the curriculum and in extra-curricular programs is at a
minimum for any church-related school. We do not find that
religion occupies a dominant place in the College's program,
the record clearly showing that students are not required to
attend and participate in many religious observances. It is,
of course, accredited. The record does not disclose any great
activity among the alumnae of a religious nature, and
although the image of Hood in the community is that of a
good, sound, and efficient College, there is no showing that
it is considered to be religiously slanted. Under the above
circumstances, it is obvious that neither the U.C.C. nor any
other religion is running the institution, or has control over
it.
The stated purposes [of Western Maryland] include
religious ob]ectives to a considerable extent. The college
characterizes itself as a "religiously oriented institution"
and "makers] no bones about the fact that our philosophy
at Western Maryland is a Christian philosophy "
One more than one-third of the members of the gov-
erning board are required by its Charter to be Methodist
Ministers, so as to give the clergy the veto power over
any change inimical to the interests of the church. The
required percentage "binds the college very closely to the
Church." The board, is heavily Methodist, and nearly all
Protestant, although quite a number of denominations are
represented thereon. All the presidents have been Methodist
Minsters. The administration is almost entirely Protestant,
although, again, quite a number of denominations are rep-
resented.
Care is taken to obtain a faculty committed to the
Christian philosophy of life, and an atheist would not be
662
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employed. Almost half of the faculty is Methodist, and al-
most all Protestant. Anproximately 40o%0 of the student body
is Methodist, and almost all Protestant. The large number
of Methodists is due to greater likelihood of acceptance of
Methodist "borderline cases * * because they seem part
of the constituency of the college," and to the large number
of Methodist students who become familiar with the college
during church conferences on the campus. The college has
a significant number of Methodist pre-ministerial students.
Some of these are eiven scholarships ranging from 1/2 to
full tuition. And the children of Methodist Ministers are
chareed only half tuition.
The church provides "financial support of considerable
value," both operational and capital, the operational contri-
bution beina between 2 and 3% of the budget. The college is
affiliated with, and supports, denominational educational as-
sociations.
The colleeze campus is very heavily used by Protestant
religious groups (some at actual cost), and "logically and
naturally there have been of course more of the Methodist
program here than any of the other denominations."
The college fosters a religious program, under the direc-
tion of a Methodist Minister Participation in Protestant
religious services is required of all students. The requirement
is publicized so that if anyone has conscientious scruples
about attending such services "he should know that before
he comes."
The college makes a conscious effort to integrate reli-
gion, and specifically Christianity, with the curriculum and
extracurricular life. Because Methodism does not have the
wide range of dogma that one, or more, religions have,
there is less specific reli~ious restriction in regard to curricu-
lum, but the school endeavors to provide a religious moti-
vation.
We quote briefly from material contained in documents
issued by the College: "Many rof the students] become
seriously interested in religion for the first time [while
attending the college] "
Under the heading "What Has the College Done For The
Church," after listing what we have named above, we find
the following:
"The principal contribution the College is mak-
ing to the Church is in accordance with its [the Col-
lege's] basic purpose: to provide the best in higher
education within the framework and atmosphere of
the verities and values of our Christian faith." (Em-
phasis added.)
The college is accredited by the Middle States Associ-
ation of Schools and Colleges and the University Senate of
the Methodist Church. It is proud of the number of its alumni
who enter the Christian, and particularly the Methodist min-
istry The image of the college in the community is strongly
Methodist.
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Here, the stated purposes of the College have a distinctly
religious "flavor," and they clearly indicate a considered
resolution to promote religious activities and exercises. The
Board of Trustees consists of 27 Methodists in a membership
of 40, with virtually all of the remainder being Protestants.
And, of course, at least one more than one-third must be
Methodist Ministers, which "binds the college very closely
to the Church." The admmistrative officers are almost en-
tirely Protestant; and the full-time faculty consists of 30
Methodists in a membership of 51.
Notre Dame's stated purposes are deeply and intensely
religious. The theory of Catholic education is that Prayer,
Holy Mass and the Sacraments represent "the Unifying
forces," and "the instructional program interlocks with the
non-instructional program; objectives with methods and
means, and all to an essential, interwoven unity " "All of
[the College's] objectives are implemented in some degree
in every department." The institution's "whole life is lived
in the Catholic atmosphere, which assumes that earthly life
is to be lived * * * in terms of a preparation for the future
life with God," and to that end, it "harmonizes" its entire
"program with the philosophy and theology of the Catholic
Church." The entire program of the College is so ordered
"that [the student's] life and study and the atmosphere
of the college are permeated, motivated, enlarged and inte-
grated by the Catholic way of life as developed and expressed
in the daily prayer, liturgy, Sacraments and Holy Mass of
the Church." (Emphasis ours.) "And Outward Grace * * *
Since the Christ-thought, the Christ-word and the Christ-deed
are the norms of community living in a Catholic college for
women, intimations of this presence should be found every-
where: In the Chapel-[andl in the Class Room * * * "
"This expresses our aim to have the spiritual support and
vivify the whole college atmosphere." Extracts taken from
Exhibits in evidence. "God bless you and your apostolate
in the home, classroom, laboratory, business office, etc.
Gratefully in Our Lady " (Sentence from a letter of Sister
Miriam to the Girls of 1961.) "Make your payment a Christ-
mas Gift this year Help meet the $750,000 Matching Grant
for the Science Building [the building involved in the grant
under Chapter 66] * * * And you know that your gift to the
College is a gift to God for the furtherance of his work.
May the Christ Child bless you for your generosity * *
(Letter from Sister Miriam dated December, 1962)
If erected, each class in the new science building will
open with a prayer
The governing board is controlled by a Catholic religious
order whose members are completely committed to Catholic
discipline and educational philosophy The administration
is almost entirely religious. The faculty are predominantly
nuns who are appointed by the Provincial Superior of the
religious order (who is Chairman of the governing board),
in consultation with the President, who is also a member
of the order Administration and faculty are chosen on the
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basis of commitment to the college objectives and ideals,
and are overwhelmingly Catholic. Ten per cent of the students
are candidates for a religious order and more than 97%
of the whole student body are Catholic. This percentage
cannot be deemed coincidental.
The college is owned and has been given heavy financial
assistance by the religious order It is officially a member
of, and supports, a number of distinctly Catholic associations
and institutions. It makes its campus available for use by
the Catholic Church and related groups, but not to non-
Catholic organizations. It has close ties with the Archdiocese
of Baltimore.
Catholicity permeates the college program: the physical
surroundings; the rich variety of college-sponsored, exclu-
sively Catholic observances, many of which are compul-
sory for Catholic students, if not for the entire student body;
the curriculum; extracurricular activities; and the student
advisory and counseling program.
The college and the accrediting agencies report a high
level of success in achieving the religious objectives of the
institution. The alumnae, individually and as an organization
constituting "an integral part" of the college activity, are
deeply engaged in the promotion and defense of Catholicism
and the Catholic Church.
The college provides supplemental programs of strong
Catholic religious content for nuns teaching in parochial
schools and in its Adult Institutes for the community at large.
Its image in the community, as expressed m its publi-
cations, constituencies, relations with the Archdiocese, cere-
monies, and way of life in general, is distinctly and intensely
Catholic..
Since the evidence relating to this institution (St.
Joseph] is so similar to that regarding Notre Dame, we
curtail, somewhat, our analysis thereof.
The stated purpose of St. Joseph College seems to be
even more strongly religious than Notre Dame's. The reli-
gious order of dedicated nuns has complete control of the
government and administration. The nuns have taken and
abide by vows of strict obedience. The faculty is chosen with
a view to achieving the religious ideals of the college, both
by precept and example, and preference is given to Catholics;
it, as a whole, is sympathetic to the Catholic philosophy of
education. The majority of the faculty are Catholic priests
or nuns, and there are but a small number of non-Catholic
members. The student body includes candidates for the
religious order, and has consistently been virtually 100%
Catholic; approximately 90% of the students are graduates
of Catholic parochial high schools. The Catholic character
of the student boyd is achieved by design.
The religious order owns the college through the cor-
porate form and has provided virtually 100% of the financial
assistance needed over and above operating income.
The college is affiliated with, and supports, distinctly
Catholic associations and institutions, and like Notre Dame,
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is a certified affiliate of the Catholic University of America.
The supplementary uses of the campus have been exclusively
by Catholic religious groups.
The physical surroundings are strongly religious. Re-
ligious observance is strongly Catholic, richly textured, and
extensively participated in: "In general, the Theocentric
orientation of a Christian student's life is encouraged."
The accrediting agencies have specifically found St.
Joseph to be accomplishing its religious objectives. The
alumnae, individually and as an organization, are distin-
guished by the number of members of religious orders,
the high percentage of active Catholic workers, and the
devotion to the alumnae association's objectives: "to promul-
gate the principles and ideals of Catholicism * * * defend-
ing and promoting the interest of the Church, in promulgat-
ing Catholic education and in supporting the Church and its
activities."
The supplementary instructional programs are strongly
Catholic, as is the image of the college in the community
If erected, the new science building will house crucifixes,
"maybe" statues, and "very likely" waterfonts.5
In holding that the grant to Hood College did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, but that the grants
to Western Maryland College, Notre Dame College, and St. Joseph
College constituted grants to "sectarian" institutions and hence con-
flicted with that clause, the court purported to apply the following
test:
We must examine each of the statutes and decide
whether it can be demonstrated that its purpose-as evi-
denced either on its face, in conjunction with its legislative
history, or in its operative effect-is to use the State's coer-
cive power to aid religion. Schempp, supra, 374 U.S. 203,
83 S.Ct. 1560, and Justice Frankfurter's opinion in McGowan,
366 U.S. at pp. 466, 467, 81 S.Ct. 1101. "If the primary pur-
pose [as contradistinguished from an incidental one] of the
state action is to promote religion, that action is m violation
of the Amendment, but if [the operative effect of] a statute
furthers both secular and religious ends, an examination of
the means used is necessary to determine whether the
state could reasonably have attained the secular end by
means which do not further the promotion of religion."
Murray, supra. Cf. McGowan, supra. No tax, in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious acti-
vities or institutions, whatever they may be called or what-
ever form they may adopt to teach or practice religions.
Everson, supra, 330 U.S. at p. 16, 67 S.Ct. at p. 512. Although
a state cannot "contribute tax-raised funds to the support of
an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any
church," it cannot exclude individuals, because of their faith
o. 220 A.2d at 66-72.
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or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of valid public
welfare legislation. Everson, supra, (a case wherein the
Court stated the factual situation "verged" upon the im-
permissible) When the power, prestige and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious
belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minori-
ties to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion
is plain. Engel, supra, 370 U.S., at p. 431, 82 S.Ct. 1261. We
are unable to accept appellees' contention that every religious
observance by an institution sectarianizes the same, but
feel that the question of sectarianization depends upon a con-
sideration of the observances, themselves, and the mode,
zeal, and frequency with which they are made. These prin-
ciples are sufficient, we think, to determine our present
issues, and we shall apply them in considering the four
statutes involved..
The experts on both sides are in general accord that the
following factors are significant in determining whether an
educational institution is religious or sectarian: (1) the stated
purposes of the college; (2) the college personnel, which in-
cludes the governing board, the administrative officers, the
faculty, and the student body (with considerable stress
being laid on the substantiality of religious control over the
governing board as a criterion of whether a college is sec-
tarian), (3) the college's relationship with religious organi-
zations and groups, which relationship includes the extent
of ownership, financial assistance, the college's memberships
and affiliations, religious purposes, and miscellaneous as-
pects of the college's relationship with its sponsoring church;
(4) the place of religion in the college's program, which
includes the extent of religious manifestation in the physical
surroundings, the character and extent of religious observ-
ance sponsored or encouraged by the college, the required
participation for any or all students, the extent to which
the college sponsors or encourages religious activity of sects
different from that of the college's own church and the place
of religion in the curriculum and in extra-curricular pro-
grams; (5) the result or "outcome" of the college program,
such as accreditation and the nature and character of the
activities of the alumni; and (6) the work and image of the
college in the community a
The question whether there are substantial ambiguities in this
"test" is one which may more appropriately be discussed in the
concluding portion of this article.
The Maryland court specifically stated that the grants in
question did not violate the Maryland Constitution.7
In order to place this decision of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in its proper perspective, one must take note of at least
two other decisions of that court--one decided in February, 1966,
6. Id. at 64-6.
7. Id. at 73, 76,
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and the other in July, 1966. In the earlier of these decisions,
Murray v Comptroller of the Treasury,8 the Court of Appeals held,
inter alia, that a state statute, which provided tax exemption for
"[h]ouses and buildings used exclusively for public worship, and
the furniture contained therein, and any parsonage used in con-
nection therewith, and the grounds appurtenant to such houses,
buildings and parsonages and necessary for the respective uses
thereof" 9 was not violative of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Truitt v Board of Public Works,10 the
second of these cases, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected
a claim of constitutional invalidity based on the First Amendment
to the U S. Constitution with respect to the Hospital Con-
struction Loan Act of 1964, as amended, under which the
State of Maryland was authorized to make construction loans to
both church-affiliated and non-church-affiliated hospitals. In so
doing it distinguished the principle case and commented:
In this case, we find that while under the Act religious
interests may be indirectly benefited, the State action is
taken to promote the general welfare of society, apart from
any religious considerations; that the promotion of religion
is not a primary purpose or effect; and that the State could
not reasonably have attained the secular end by means
which would not indirectly aid religious interests.1 '
POSSIBLE EFFECT OF PRINCIPAL DECISION ON FEDERAL PROGRAMS OF
AID TO EDUCATION
If one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the opinion
of the Maryland Court of Appeals represents the views of the
majority of the U S. Supreme Court, one must acknowledge
that several federal programs of aid to church-affiliated schools
and colleges are of doubtful constitutional validity Counsel for
the petitioners in the instant case, in their Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, listed over eighty federal programs in which, it was
claimed, denominational schools and colleges were permitted to
participate. 1" Limitations of time and space preclude any extended
discussion of all these various programs; in fact, it may be suf-
ficient for present purposes to refer merely to the programs ad-
ministered under three acts of Congress: the National School Lunch
8. 241 Md.. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966), cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 36 (1966).
9. 216 A.2d at 900.
10. 243 Md. 375, 221 A.2d 370 (1966).
11. 221 A.2d at 386.
12. Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Court Of Appeals of Maryland, Appendix
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Act of 1946,1 the National Defense Education Act of 1958,'4 and
the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.15
Under the first of these acts, there is the possibility of direct
grants to non-profit private schools.' The second of these acts
provides m part for the lending of money directly to non-profit
private schools for the procurement of equipment." The "direct-
ness" of the aid provided under these two acts, and the possibility
that some of the schools thus aided are "sectarian," suggest that
the rule of the Maryland decision would render these programs
partially invalid.
The third act is perhaps most similar to the state laws in-
validated by the Maryland court in the principal case; it provides
in part for grants and loans to institutions of higher education for
the construction of certain buildings. 8 As originally enacted, this
act limited the grants to those which would be used in the con-
struction of structures "especially designed for instruction or re-
search m the natural or physical sciences, mathematics, modem
foreign languages, or engineering, or for use as a library "19 This
requirement was deleted by the 1965 amendment. 20
As the federal grants under the Higher Education Facilities
Act of 1963, as amended, are not materially different from those
under the Maryland statutes in the instant case, one must con-
clude that the rule of the instant case would serve to invalidate
some of the grants under the federal act. Although the Maryland
court suggests that the question of legal "sectarianism" has to be
decided on a case-by-case basis, it is safe to assume that fed-
eral grants to Western Maryland College, Notre Dame College
(Maryland), and St. Joseph College (Maryland) are violative of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, according to
the formula used by the Maryland court. (Each of the above-named
colleges m Maryland was the recipient of at least one grant from
the United States Government under the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963, as amended, in fiscal years 1965 and 1966.)21
SUPREME COURT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MARYLAND DECISION
In view of the established practice by which the Supreme
Court grants petitions for writs of certiorari when four or more
13. 60 STAT. 230 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1964).
14. 72 STAT. 1580 (1958), 20 U.S.C. j 401 (1964).
15. 77 STAT. 363 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 701 (1964).
16. 60 SrAT. 233 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1759 (1964).
17. 72 STAT. 1590 (1958), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 445 (1964).
18. 77 STAT. 364 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 712 (1964).
19. 77 STAT. 368 (1963).
20. 79 STAT. 1266 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 716 (Supp. I, 1965).
21. Based on mimeographed information supplied by the U.S. Department of lealth.
Education, and Welfare.
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justices have voted to grant such peitions, 22 the only proper in-
ference that can be drawn from a denial of a petition for writ
of certiorari is that fewer than four justices have voted to grant
the petition.2 3  There is that inevitable temptation, however, to
speculate concerning the hidden meaning of the Court's denial of
certiorari. Of course, the practical effect of the denial is to leave
the decision of the lower court standing; in the instant case the
effect is, in addition, as suggested above, to perpetuate doubt
concerning the validity of a number of important congressional
programs of assistance to education-both at the secondary and
collegiate levels. Why did the Court deny certiorari? Why did
only two members of the Court express the view that the case
should have been reviewed by the Supreme Court 724 Surely, the
basic constitutional question was clearly presented; the Maryland
court was careful to decide the case on the basis of the federal
Constitution-not on the basis of the state constitution.2 5 If most
of the justices agreed with the lower court, why did they not want
to say so, thus correcting an erroneous impression on the part of
Congress-an impression which might lead the Congress to pass
even more acts of assistance to church-affiliated as well as non-
denominational schools and colleges? If, on the other hand, they
disagreed with the Maryland court, why did they not want to
reverse the state court and thus ease the minds of not only those
who had to administer the federal programs, but also the mem-
bers of Congress?
One is left with this fundamental question: What will the
Supreme Court do with a similar case if such a case is presented
in the future? It is unlikely that this question will be raised in
the context of a review of the decision of the supreme court of
a state. This improbability does not result entirely from problems
of standing, which did not bother the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land;26 it also results from the fact that many state constitutional
provisions prohibit, either explicitly or implicitly, the granting of
state funds to church-affiliated schools or colleges.2 7 Obviously, if
22. STERN AND GRxsswAx, SuPREbm COURT PRAcTicE 174 (3rd ed, 1962).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953), and Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-19 (1950).
24. Justices Stewart and Harlan expressed the view that the petition should have been
granted. 385 U.S. 97.
25. 220 A.2d at 70, 73, 76.
6. The Court of Appeals did state that the Horace Mann League of the United States
lacked standing- however, it reached the opposite conclusion with regard to the individual
plaintiffs. Id. at 54-5.
27. The following state constitutional provisions are examples of provisions which un-
ambiguously eliminate the possibility of state aid to church-affiliated colleges or-univer-
sities:
CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 22 "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in consequence of appropriation mado by law, and upon warrants duly drawn
thereon by the Controller* and no money shall ever be appropriated or drawn
from the State Treasury for the purilose or benefit of any corporation, association,
asylum, hosital, or any other Institution not under the exclusive management and
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a state legislature is prohibited by the constitution of the state
from passing laws aiding church-affiliated schools and colleges,
there can be no acts of the legislature for the Supreme Court to
review
There is, however, another way in which the issue of the con-
stitutionality of acts similar to those passed by the Maryland leg-
islature may come before the United States Supreme Court. A por-
tion of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provides that
the words "academic facilities" shall not refer to "any facility
used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for re-
ligious worship.'2 If the Commissioner of Education were to dis-
approve state plans for participation in the program of assistance
set forth in this act on the ground that such plans provided for
the construction of facilities "to be used for sectarian instruction,"
then the state so affected could seek review of the Commissioner's
decision in the courts of appeals; 9 moreover, a ruling by one of
the courts of appeals would be reviewable by the United States
Supreme Court.80
It is still true, of course, that there is little chance that any
individual taxpayer will be able to challenge the validity of any
of the federal programs because of lack of standing.32
control of the State as a state institution, nor shall any grant or donation of
property ever be made thereto by the state.
ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 3 "Neither the general assembly nor any county, city,
town, township, school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any
church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled
by any church or sectarian denomination whatever* nor shall any grant or do-
nation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made by the state or
any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose."
UTAH CONST. art. 10, § 13 "Neither the Legislature nor any county, city,
town, school district or other public corporation, shall make any appropriation to
aid In the support of any school, seminary, academy, college, university or other
institution, controlled in whole, or in part, by any church, sect or denomination
whatever."
The constitutions of a number of states contain provisions which are ex-
plicit as to school funds but leave in doubt the question whether appropriations
for church-affiliated colleges or universities would be proper. For example, ALA.
CONST. art. 14, § 263 provides: "No money raised for the support of the public
schools shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian or de-
nominational school."
Other state constitutions contain statements of varying degrees of ambiguity.
Even a rather express prohibition of the use of state funds for sectarian
education is no guarantee that a state court will not, on occasion, interpret such
a provision so as to make possible such aid. In Opinion of the Justices, 113 A.2d
114 (N.H. 1955), for example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire advised the
legislature of that state that a pending bill providing aid for all hospitals in the
state (including church-affiliated hospitals) which offered training In nursing was
not violative of any provisions of the state constitution. Specifically the court stat-
ed that the pending bill would not violate a portion of N.H. CONSTr. part 2, art-
83, which reads as follows "Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by
taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or institutions
of any religious sect or denomination." See also State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 28
N.E.2d 256 (Ind. 1940), and Note, "Catholic Schools and Public Money," 50 YALM
L. J. 917 (1941).
28. 77 STAT. 374 (1963), a8 amended, 20 U.S.C. § 751a (2) (C), (Supp. I, 1965).
29. 77 STAT. 370 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 721 (a) (1964).
30. 77 STAT. 370 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 721 (c) (1964).
31. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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It has been suggested that the cases already decided by the
United States Supreme Court do not provide an answer to the
question whether Congress or a state legislature "establishes" a
religion in violation of the First Amendment (the Fourteenth
Amendment, in the case of a state legislature), when it gives
money directly to church-affiliated colleges and universities for
the purpose of aiding in the construction of classrooms.2  Certainly
there is no holding with respect to this precise question. The only
case since 1940 apparently dealing with financial aid to denomina-
tional schools,3" Everson v Board of Education (1947) ,3 involved
reimbursement of parents for the cost of bus transportation to
parochial schools. No "direct" aid was given to the schools; the
parents were the immediate recipients of the aid, and the parochial
schools were only benefited to the extent that they were able to
apply the sums that would have otherwise have been spent on
transportation to something else. The Court, or at least five of
the justices, found in this scheme no violation of the Establishment
Clause.
Other cases involving schools have dealt with a released-time
program involving the use of public school classrooms,5 a re-
leased-time program not involving the use of public school class-
rooms,36 the reading of a "nonsectarian" prayer in the public
schools,3 7 and the reading of portions of the Bible in the public
schools.3 8 These and other cases dealing with alleged violations
of the Establishment Clause3 9 and the Free Exercise Clause 40 of
32. 77 HARv. L. Rrv. 1353 (1964).
33. In Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), the Supreme
Court upheld a state statute providing for the supplying of books to school children, in-
eluding children who attended church-aflliated schools. However, as pointed out by Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion in School District of Abington Townships v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 248 (1963), the only constitutional issue that was raised in the Cochran case
was whether there had been a taking of private property for a non-public use. Not until
1940, when the Court rendered its decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, did
the Court make it clear that both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment are made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
34. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
35. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Here the Court held that
such a program violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as made ap-
plicable to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment.
36. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In this case the Court distinguished the
McC.oflnm case and upheld the program.
37. Engel v. Vitale, v. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In this case the Court found that the use
of such a "nonsectarian" prayer violated the Establishment Clause.
38. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). As in the
Engel case, supra note 37, the Court concluded that the Bible-reading involved in this
case was violative of the Establishment Clause.
39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) Braunfeld v. Brown. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). In each of these cases
the Court held that the Sunday-closing laws did not conflict with the Establishment
Clause. In the latter two cases the Court was also confronted with an allegation that the
laws in question were violative of the Free Exercise Clause in that they required Ortho-
dox Jews to choose between substantlal economic loss and noncompliance with the rule
of their religious faith forbidding them to labor on their Sabbath. The Court rejected their
contention. However the Court's pronouncement with respect to the Free Exercise Clause
appears to be qualified by the Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner, stfra note 40, in
which the Court found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause in the denial of benefits
under a state unemployment compensation scheme because of the petitioner's refusal
(based on religious scruples) to work on Saturdays.
40. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 867 U.S. 488, 496 (1961), for example, Mr. Justice Black,
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the First Amendment are helpful only insofar as the statements
of the various justices provide clues as to their thinking with re-
spect to the present issue.
The problem of prediction is compounded by the fact that there
has been a substantial change in the personnel of the Court since
the decision in the Everson case was rendered in 1947; in fact,
of the justices who participated in that case, only Justices Black
and Douglas remain. Thus, it is difficult to know how the remain-
ing present justices would have voted with respect to the one
Supreme Court case which is factually closest to the instant case.
Furthermore, Justice Fortas has not yet had an opportunity to
express himself in a case dealing with either the Establishment
or the Free Exercise Clause. Additional uncertainty results from
Mr Justice Clark's recent resignation.
In spite of this uncertainty, it is possible to say that Justice
Douglas would probably vote to affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals of Maryland-at least with respect to that part of the
decision which invalidated three acts of the Maryland legislature.
His statements regarding the inability of the federal or a state
government to give financial aid to religious institutions are too
all-embracing to permit one to draw any other inference. The
following quotation from Douglas' concurring opinion in Engel v
Vitale (1962)41 in which the Supreme Court invalidated the use
m the public schools of a so called "nonsectarian" prayer, is il-
luminating:
The point for decision is whether the Government can
constitutionally finance a religious exercise. Our system at
the federal and state level is presently honeycombed with
speaking for the Court, declared. "This Maryland religious test for public office [involving
a requirement that a notary public declare his belief in God] unconstitutionally invades
the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against
him." Some of the other cases dealing with the Free Exercise Clause are. United States
v. Seeger, 3S0 U.S. 163 (1965) , Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) Nlemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) , Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) ,
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling,
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943) Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), Largent v. Texas,
318 U.S. 418 (1943) Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584 (1942), vacated 319 U.S. 103 (1943), Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States), 245 U.S. 366 (1918)
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) , Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
41. Supra note 37.
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such financing. Nevertheless, I think it is an unconstitutional
undertaking whatever form it takes.4 2 [Footnote omitted.]
In a footnote Douglas quoted a description of such financing,
which included references to the ability of veterans who received
funds under the 1944 G. I. Bill to attend denominational schools,
the financial assistance to private schools under the National
School Lunch Act, and financial assistance to private hospitals
under the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946.4
3
In a concurring opinion in School District of Abington Town-
ship v Schempp (1963), in which the Supreme Court struck down
the practice of Bible-reading in the public schools, Justice Douglas
remarked:
The most effective way to establish any institution is
to finance it; and this truth is reflected in the appeals by
church groups for public funds to finance their religious
schools. Financing a church either in its strictly religious
activities or in its other activities is equally unconstitutional,
as I understand the Establishment Clause. Budgets for one
activity may be technically separable from budgets for
others. But the institution is an inseparable whole, a living
organism which is strengthened in proselytizing when it
is strengthened in any department by contributions from
other than its own members.
Such contributions may not be made by the State even
in a minor degree without violating the Establishment Clause.
It is not the amount of public funds expended; as this case
illustrates, it is the use to which the public funds are put
that is controlling. For the First Amendment does not say
that some forms of establishment are allowed; it says
that "no law respecting an establishment of religion" shall
be made. What may not be done directly may not be done
indirectly lest the Establishment Clause become a mockery."
[Footnotes omitted.]
It is true that Douglas wrote the majority opinion in Zorach v
Clauson (1952) ,4 in which the Court upheld a released-time pro-
gram not involving the use of public school classrooms; however,
Douglas' approach was apparently consistent with his views re-
garding the unconstitutionality of financial aid to religious mstitu-
42. 370 U.S. at 437.
43. Id. at 437 n. 1.
44. 374 U.S. at 229-30.
45. Supro note 36. The following passage from Douglas' opinion seems to express some-
thing other than a view of absolute separation of church and state
We are a religious people whose Institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs
of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the paxt of govern-
ment that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flou-
rish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
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tions. In Zorach Douglas was careful to point out that the pro-
gram did not involve any "expenditure of public funds.""4
If one were a betting man, he might wager that Justice Black
would agree with Justice Douglas regarding the unconstitutionality
of the aid involved in the instant case. Certainly, a part of
Black's much-quoted dictum in the Everson case-"No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activites or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion"' 7-suggests that
he would be most hesitant to approve of state aid to three of the
colleges involved in the instant case; this statement assumes the
importance of the findings of the Maryland court with respect to
the integration of religion into the curriculum in these three col-
leges. In Everson, Black was careful to point out that "the state
contributes no money to the school."48
This is not to say that Black's views are m all respects iden-
tical to those of Douglas. In Engel,49 for example, Black, writing
for the majority, did not apparently regard the use of the "non-
sectarian" prayer in the public schools as the "financ[ing of] a
religious exercise," 50 which was the phrase used by Douglas. Also,
Black disagreed with Douglas regarding the validity of the released-
time program in Zorach and the validity of the Sunday-closing
laws. Dissenting in Zorach, Black stated that his concern was
not only with the use or non-use of public school classrooms for
sectarian classes, but also with the coercive effects of state ac-
tion.5  In the cases dealing with the Sunday-closing laws, 52 Black
joined the majority in upholding these laws; he apparently agreed
that these laws involved neither an establishment of religion nor
an interference with the free exercise of religion. 53  In none of
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with re-
ligious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian
needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the re-
ligious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Con-
stitution a requirement that the government shows a callous indifference
to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no re-
ligion over those who do believe 343 U.S. at 313-14.
46. 343 U.S. at 309.
47. 330 U.S. at 16.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Supra note 37.
50. 370 U.S. at 437.
51. 343 U.S. at 316-18.
52. Supra note 39.
53. However, Black joined the majority in Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 40, in which
the Supreme Court stated that a state could not deny unemployment compensation bene-
fits to one who refused to work on Saturday because of religious scruples. As suggested
by Stewart in his concurring opinion, the decision in Sherbert casts doubt upon the validity
of the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 39, in
which the Court held that a state could, consistently with the Free Exercise Clause,
require an Orthodox Jew to close on Sunday, even though the result of such a decision
might be to cause the Jew to choose between operating on Saturdays (in violation of
his religious beliefs) and going out of business.
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these opinions does one find language suggesting that Black would
disagree with Douglas regarding the issues involved in the instant
case.
To attempt to predict the manner in which the other present
justices would react to the facts of the instant case, if the Court
were to rule on the substantive issues of such a case, is to in-
dulge in sheer speculation. The opinions expressed above regarding
the likelihood that Black and Douglas would vote for affirmance
of the Maryland court may be wrong, but at least some reasonably
substantial reasons can be offered in support of these views. The
same cannot be said with respect to the probabilities that any
of the remaining justices would vote in a particular way One
may have a feeling-a visceral reaction, perhaps-that at least
several of these justices would favor reversal of the Maryland de-
cision. One may point, for example, to Warren's opinion in
McGowan v Maryland (1961),5 in which he stressed the present
secular purpose of Sunday-closing laws, tended to ignore any in-
cidental benefits conferred on religious groups, and remarked,
with respect to an objection based on the availability of other secu-
lar means with which to achieve the same purpose, that there was
no factual basis for such an objection that case.55 The use of a
similar approach might lead one to conclude that legislative acts
similar to those involved in the instant case are not violative of
the Establishment Clause. Stewart's dissents in Braunfeld v Brown
(1961), 56 Engel,57 and Schempp,5 and his concurring opinion in
Sherbert v Verner (1963), 5 9 suggest an approach to the problems
of the interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause that is somewhat different from that of some of
his fellow justices. His emphasis upon free exercise of religion
and his doubts concerning the constitutional validity of the extreme
Jeffersonian view of the Establishment Clause-i.e., the theory ex-
pressed in the metaphor "wall of separation between church and
state"-might cause him to assert not only that statutes similar
to the Maryland Acts are not violative of the Establishment Clause,
but also that the granting of aid to all colleges except church-
affiliated colleges is violative of the Free Exercise Clause. One
could continue to speculate with regard to the views of the other
justices; 60 however, it would still be impossible to predict what a
54. Supra note 39.
S5. 366 U.S. at 433-34, 445, and 449-50.
56. Supra note 39.
57. Supra note 37.
58. Supra note 38.
59. Supra note 40.
60. For example, one may note the following: Harlan joined Frankfurter's concurrence
in the Sunday-closing law cases (McGowan, Gallagher, McGinley, and Braunfeld), Joined
Goldberg's concurrence in Schempp, and dissented in Sherbert. White joined in Harlan's
dissent in Sherbert. Brennan dissented in Gallagher, concurred in part and dissented in
part in Braunfeld, concurred in Schempp, and wrote the majority opinion in Sherbert v.
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majority of the Supreme Court would do in a case factually simi-
lar to the instant case.
EVALUATION OF THE MARYLAND DECISION
It is still true, of course, that "general propositions do not
decide concrete cases."' 61 The application of one general proposi-
tion is difficult enough; the problem is greatly complicated when
one attempts to apply, simultaneously, several general propositions.
This is what the Maryland court has tried to do. The blame can-
not, however, be placed entirely on that court, for it is the Su-
preme Court which has used the very phrases which the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has had to interpret.
The Maryland court has indicated the source of the general
propositions which it has sought to apply in the instant case:6 2
Justice Clark's majority opinion in Schempp, Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in McGowan, the majority opinion in the Mary-
land case of Murray v Comptroller (which, in turn appears to
be based on Warren's majority opinion and Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in McGowan), and Black's majority opinions in Everson
and Engel.
One may, in attempting to analyze the general statements used
by the United States Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of
Appeals, discern certain different and possibly conflicting theories.
For example, one may agree with Professor Kauper that the
Supreme Court has, at various times, applied a strict separation
theory, a neutrality theory, and an accommodation theory 63 This
analysis is undoubtedly helpful, but it does not remove one basic
difficulty- It is still possible to apply each of the statements con-
tained m the Maryland "test" separately in such a way as to
reach opposite conclusions. An illustration seems in order Black's
statement in Everson that "no tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
Verner. Having done this, however, one is still faced with the difficult task of attempting
to apply certain general propositions; as suggested in the last section of this article, the
mere statement of such general propositions does not necessarily aid one in deciding how
an individual will apply such propositions to the particular facts of a case.
61. Holmes, J., (dissenting), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
62. Supra, pp. 666-7.
63. "1. The theory that the establishment clause used in conjunction with the free
exercise clause requires a strict separation of church and state and that government can
do nothing which involves governmental support of religion or which is favorable to the
cultivation of religious interests.
"2. The theory that the establishment clause requires government to be neutral with
respect to religious matters and that in its legislation and programs it cannot, therefore,
do anything which either aids or hinders religion.
"3. The theory that any limitation derived from the establishment limitation cannot
be rigidly applied so as to preclude all aid to religion or to require absolute neutrality,
that questions arising under the establishment limitation cannot be used in isolation from
the free exercise guarantee, and that in some situations government inust, and in other
situations may, accommodate its policy and laws in favor of religious freedom.
"The first two theories are conceptual in character. The third represents a pragmatic
approach "KAUPRE, PALIIOoN AND TH CONSTTUnON 59 (1964).
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whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion"-the strict separation theory in Pro-
fessor Kauper's analysis-is susceptible of at least two interpreta-
tions. On the one hand, the phrase "religious activities or insti-
tutions" can be construed to mean the act of worship, or those
organizations the chief purpose of which is to conduct services of
worship in the conventional sense. Presumably, church-affiliated
colleges would not be included in this definition of "religious ac-
tivities or institutions." On the other hand, it is not unreasonable
to suggest that denominational colleges, at which religion perme-
ates both the curricular and extracurricular activities, are included
within the definition of "religious institutions."
Similarly, one may consider the application of the following
quotation taken from the Murray case and contained in the ma-
jority's opinion in the instant case:
If the primary purpose [as contradistinguished from an
incidental one] of the state action is to promote religion,
that action is in violation of the Amendments, but if [the
operative effect of] a statute furthers both secular and
religious ends, an examination of the means used is neces-
sary to determine whether the state could reasonably have
attained the secular end by means which do not further the
promotion of religion.4 6 [Brackets in the original.]
In the Maryland case, one might conclude that the primary pur-
pose of the acts was to aid secular education and not religion; one
might also conclude, however, that the acts of the legislature did,
in addition to furthering the cause of secular education, substantially
aid certain religious groups. Conceivably, one might decide that,
as claimed by the plaintiffs, the state could have achieved its secu-
lar goal by simply granting funds to non-church-affiliated colleges.
This final conclusion would cause one to agree with the court's
judgment in the instant case.
However, one might reach the opposite conclusion simply by
refusing to accept the allegation that the secular goal could have
been achieved by the granting of funds to the other non-denomma-
tional colleges. 5 Thus, one's ultimate decision is not the result of
any mechanistic application of the general proposition set forth
above. The answer to the question whether the secular goal could
have been achieved by means other than those used is dependent, not
64 Supra, p. 666.
65. "Among the 2,000 or so Institutions of higher education, about 1,300 are private
schools 512 are nondenominational, 475 Protestants, 308 Roman Catholic, and 24 are of
other denominations.
"Even with all the private and public college classrooms, there will not be room
for the youngsters who are coming along unless we aid our institutions of higher learn-
ing, both private and public." 109 CoNo. REc, 19378 (1963) (rermarks of Senator Prouty).
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only upon the "facts" of the case, but also upon one's interpreta-
tion of those facts; this interpretation depends, in turn, upon many
factors, including the comparative cost of the alternative courses of
action and one's personal attitude towards the desirability of en-
couraging the maintenance and growth of private institutions of
higher learning. 6
Not only do general propositions not decide concrete cases, but
also they can, if applied with strict logic, lead to some rather
extreme results. For example, the general principle which the court
in the instant case took from the Murray case could logically be
applied in the following fashion: Grants to all private, bona fide
charitable organizations, including churches, might be sustained on
the ground that the chief purpose was to assist the poor and that
nonreligious charitable organizations could not do the job as well
or as cheaply Or, going one step further, one might argue that
a state could, consistently with the Establishment Clause, grant
funds to all institutions which sought to combat the substantial prob-
lem of mental health; such grants might include funds given to the
Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Episcopal Church to pay
for the cost of providing for confession. After all, it can be argued
that such confession to a priest or minister has therapeutic value
which may be analogous to that derived from the early stages of
treatment by a psychiatrist.6 7  It might be possible to show that
66. It is interesitng to note that the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in purporting to
apply the various general propositions which, collectively, may be regarded as Its "test,"
referred to the plaintiffs' claim regarding the availability of other secular means by which
the state could have attained the goal of secular education only when it discussed the
aid given to Western Maryland College. (Apparently it belived that the question of
alternative secular means was irrelevant with regard to Notre Dame and St. Joseph be-
cause It found that "  the operative effect of the Bills demonstrates, In a legal
and constitutional sense, a purpose to use the State's coercive power to aid religion "
220 A.2d at 72.) Although the opinion is not entirely clear on this point, it appears that
tho court accepted the plaintiffs' claim, remarking that Western Maryland College "has
made no attempt to comply with the requirement" set forth in the Murray case re-
garding the need to show that the state could not have achieved Its secular goals In any
way not involving the promotion of religion. Id. at 69-70. Thus, It seems that the court was
unwilling to presume, as Warren apparently did In the McGowan case, (supra note 39)
that the legislature had made a determination that such alternative means were not
available. At least the court was not willing to presume the validity of such a determina-
tion, If made.
67. "Important levels in therapy are confession, ventilation and the psychiatric inter-
viev-s. Confession Is the story the patient tells the therapist and, in itself, It is an Im-
portant treatment step. Pent-up, hidden thoughts and feelings are poured out into words.
Frightening ideas and emotions are made less so by being externalized. Confession both
lessens and punishes guilt. It is lessened by being shared with the therapist. Often the
;,atient comes to realize that the dimensions of his guilt are much smaller than he had
thought. Also, the patient Is punished by confessing. It is shaming to reveal weaknesses
and misbehavior to another. Often it is a healing punishment. The therapist Is not con-
temptuous, but he does not condone, unless he can do so honestly. Some patients are so
masochistic or sometimes so exhibitionistic that they berate and flagellate themselves
mercilessly. Then it may be good Judgment on the part of the therapist to moderate the
verbal orgy." STRECKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 215, 216 (6th ed. Pearson 1962).
That the above hypothetical situation is not entirely beyond the realm of possibility
is suggested by the fact that some denominations are presently involved in psychotherapy,
as Is made clear by the following quotation.
On the other hand, in some liberal denominations the minister's task
is defined as that of the psychotherapist, namely, the relir,'f of psychologi-
cal distress. The minister Is effective because of what he does, not who
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conventional psychiatric facilities would be insufficient to achieve
the desired end and that only aid to these churches could solve
the problem.
If one concludes that the sorts of grants described in the preced-
mg paragraph would violate the First Amendment, one does so,
not because of the application of the abstract principle discussed
above, but rather because of a decision that the line between valid
and invalid aid to religion must be drawn somewhere, and that the
sorts of aid described above would fall on the invalid side of that
line; once this decision has been made, the general proposition can
be manipulated so as to support that decision. One may rationalize,
for example, that the main purpose of financing religious confessions
would be to aid religion.
Similarly, in the instant case, the court's task was to draw a
line between what is permitted under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and what is not permitted. In order for
one to decide for himself whether the line was properly drawn, one
must take into account a certain amount of history, one's own
concept of the purposes of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses (which may depend in part on one's study of history),
and the precise facts of the instant case.
There are probably some historical facts which are not in doubt.
For example, one may point to the persecution of the Christians
until about 313 A.D., the religious crusades from 1096 to 1270, the
Spanish Inquisition (15th century), the dispute between Henry VIII
and the Pope in the 16th century, and the desire of the Pilgrim
Fathers to escape religious persecution when they sailed to the
New World in 1620-all of which were described by Chief Justice
Prescott of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the instant case.65
There is also no doubt of Jefferson's presentation to the Virginia
legislature of an "Act for Establishing Religious Freedom" in 1779,89
of Madison's preparation in 1785 of his "Memorial and Remon-
strance," in which he protested against a proposed act of the Vir-
ginia assembly which would have provided for a general assess-
ment for the support of teachers of the Christian religion,70 and
he is, and he is selected on the basis of training, not "call." He is a
professional in direct competition with the secular psychotherapist which
he justifies by defining his task and role in religious words (27). This
movement is reflected in the recent formation of an association of pastor-
al counselors whose requisites for training remarkably resemble those of
a psychoanalytio institute, and whose members do not work as clergy,
but are in private practice as professional psychotherapists who declare
themselves to be "pastoral therapists." Pattison. Social and Psychologi-
cal Aspects of Religion in Psycotherap, 141 JOURNAL OF NERvOUs
AND MENTAL DISEASES 585-86 (1965).
68. 220 A.2d at 56-8.
69. STOKE s AND PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNIrTED STATES 52 (rev. one-
volume ed. 1964).
70. Id. at 56.
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of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists in 1802 in which he
referred to the creation of "a wall of separation between church and
state.""' These are not the only facts to which one might refer,
however; indeed, one of the problems is to decide what other facts
are relevant. Is it significant that, at the time of the adoption of
the Federal Constitution in 1789, only two states-Virginia and Rhode
Island-guaranteed full religious freedom? 72 Is it important that
several persons other than Madison, including Samuel Livermore,
played a substantial role in the drafting of the First Amendment? 73
In other words, to what extent can one assume that the statements
of Madison and Jefferson, which appear to represent a concept of
rather rigid separation of church and state, accurately reflect the
intention of the Congress when it proposed the First Amendment?
The answers to these and other similar questions depend on one's
interpretation of the facts, and there are at least several possible
interpretations.
It has been suggested by Professor Katz that the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment was intended to do no more than
prohibit the Congress from interfering with state activities relating
to the establishment of religion.74 Rejecting both this view"5 and
the view that the First Amendment embodies the strict separation
principle attributed to Madison and Jefferson, Professor Howe has
said that "if the First Amendment codified a figure of speech it
embraced the believing affirmations of Roger Williams and his heirs
no less firmly than it did the questioning doubts of Thomas Jeffer-
son and the Enlightenment.76 Here, Howe was referring to Roger
Williams' concern with the adverse effects on religion which lack of
separation between church and the state might have; it was not so
much a fear that the church might corrupt the state as it was a
fear that the state might corrupt the church. 7 It has also been
suggested that the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit
discrimination against one or more sects, but was not intended to
prohibit the federal government from aiding all religions equally;
thus, so the suggestion goes, the inability of the government-state or
federal-to prefer all religions to nonbelief results from the appli-
cation of the principle of equal protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and not from the application of the First Amendment.' 8
Another theory-that of Professor Kurland-is that "religion cannot
supply a basis for classification of governmental action.""
71. Id. at 53.
72. PFznza, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 118 (rev. ed. 1967).
73. SToKES AND PFEWFE, op. cit. supra note 69, at 47-8, 94-6.
74. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 10 (1964).
75. HOwu, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDENESS 22-3 (1965).
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 5-6.
78. Id. at 164-65.
79. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THU LAW 18 (1962).
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From the above discussion, the only clear conclusion that can be
drawn is that the history of the adoption of the First Amendment
is too ambiguous to permit one to say with certainty just what the
Congress had in mind when it proposed that portion of the First
Amendment which prohibits any law "respecting an establishment of
religion."8 10 (The problem is compounded by the uncertainty regard-
ing the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since Cantwell v
Connecticut (1940),81 the Supreme Court has assumed that that
amendment made the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment applicable to the states in the same manner
in which these clauses are applicable to the federal government.
Although the validity of that conclusion has been questioned, 12 it is
assumed to be correct for the purposes of further discussion below )
Nevertheless, if one assumes that the Establishment Clause was
not intended merely to prohibit Congress from interfering with exist-
Ing state practices, one may attempt to formulate a conception of a
certain minimum substantive content. One may safely say, for
example, that the amendment was at least intended to preclude the
establishment of a single church, such as the Church of England.1
3
Perhaps it is also safe to say that one of the chief concerns of the
Congress which proposed the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses was the protection of freedom of worship.8 4 The most
explicit expression of this concern is, of course, found in the Free
Exercise Clause; yet, the Establishment Clause is relevant, because
the establishment of a church may very weMl make it more difficult
for those of another faith to practice their religion. There is in-
herent in an establishment, so one can argue, a certain amount of
coercion; those of another faith may feel it necessary to conform
in order to obtain the benefits of governmental support.8 5 And,
paradoxically, those of the established church may not be free to
exercise their religion because of possible state control of that re-
ligion, as is demonstrated by the history of the Church of England.88
What has already been said about the importance of freedom
of worship suggests that a proper interpretation of the religious
clauses of the First Amendment ought to promote the most com-
plete liberty of worship that is possible. The English example of
an established church supports the conclusion expressed by Roger
Williams that "when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall
of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness
80. K.uPER, op. cit. supra note 63, at 47.
81. Supra note 40.
82. HowE, op. cit. supra note 75, at 71, et seg.
83. see, e.g., the debate of the House of Representatives on August 15, 1789, as quoted
in STOKES AND PFEMR, op. cit. supra note 69, at 94, et seg.
84. Ibid.
85. Infra note 99.
86. P7rs'R, op. cit. supra note 72, at 52-4.
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of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed
the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness. "87 Perhaps
the relevant question regarding direct grants or loans (to church-
affiliated institutions) which only "incidentally" benefit religion is
this: At what point does either a state or the federal government
become so involved in the religious functions of a church that there
is substantial danger (1) that the religious freedom of the members
of that church will be impaired because of actual or potential
governmental controls or (2) that other persons will be coerced
because of pressures created by the government's approval of a
church to which they do not belong?8s In considering possible
impairment of religious freedom because of governmental controls,
one may apply the old aphorism: "He who pays the fiddler calls
the tune." Certainly this principle can now be discerned in the
granting of aid by the federal government generally " However,
more is involved than just the possibility that Congress or a state
legislature will, in its discretion, attach conditions to the granting
of funds to church-affiliated colleges and universities; there is also
the possibility that the actions of recipients of such grants may
become, in effect, "state action," so that the restrictions of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may apply This latter possi-
bility is suggested by the case of Simkins v Moses H. Cone Mem-
orLal Hospital (1963),90 m which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit said m effect that the racially discriminatory practices of
two hospitals constituted state action because of the participation
of these hospitals in the construction program provided for in the
federal Hill-Burton Act. The court formulated the test of state
action as follows:
In our view the initial question is, rather, whether the state
or federal government, or both, have become so involved
in the conduct of these otherwise private bodies that their
activities are also the activities of these governments and
performed under their aegis without the private body neces-
87. Quoted in HowE, op. cit. supra note 75, at 5-6.
88. The reader may protest, at this point, that another general proposition has merely
been substituted for those which have been referred to above, and that the mere state-
ment of this new proposition will not answer the question whether the Maryland Court
of Appeals arrived at a sound conclusion in the instant case. This is, of course, true. In"
fact, the concept of undue involvement has been discussed by Professor Kauper (though
not in precisely the same way in which it is described above) in relation to his theory of
accommodation (KAuPER, op. cit. supra note 63, at 77-8), and yet his apparent conclusion
is, contrary to that of the author of this article, that governmental aid to all church-
related colleges would not violate the First Amendment. Id. at ll5-16. Despite the dangers
thus inherent in reliance upon such a general proposition, its use may be Justified by the
hope that it will serve as a rough guide and provide a unifying theme.
89. E.g., 78 STAT. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964). This portion of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives authority to federal agencies (wich are authorized to
extend federal assistance) to refuse to grant, or discontinue assistance, to recipients who
have failed to comply with regulations regarding nondiscrimination on the basis of race,
color, and national origin.
90. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denfd, 276 U.S. 938 (1964).
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sarily becoming either their instrumentality or their agent
in a strict sense. 91
As Professor Kauper has cautioned, 92 one must not necessarily
assume that the decision in the Simkins case goes beyond the facts
of that case; nevertheless, it points to the risks which private colleges
and universities assume when they accept government funds. Surely,
if the activities of the three Maryland colleges in the instant case
were regarded as those of the State of Maryland because of their
acceptance of funds from the state, there could be no serious doubt
about the unconstitutionality of certain practices of these colleges.
For example, could their admissions policies, which apparently
favored those of a particular religious faith, be reconciled with the
requirements, of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Similarly, could their preference for teachers of one
particular faith be sustained in view of that provision of the Four-
teenth Amendment? The apparent espousal of particular religious
creeds would- also be subject to the same objection.
The time has come, once again, to consider some of the facts
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the instant case found to
be relevant so that one can decide for himself whether the line
which that court drew is a reasonable one, in view of its other
decisions with respect to state aid to church-affiliated hospitals and
exemption from taxation for church property used for worship and
as parsonages, and in view of the apparent desire of the Congress
which proposed the First Amendment to protect religious liberty
The Maryland court found that both Notre Dame and St. Joseph
were controlled by religious orders, that their purpose was deeply
religious, that their faculties and student bodies were made up very
largely of members of the Roman Catholic Church, that religion
played a very important role m the curricular and extra-curricular
life of these colleges, that alumnae of these institutions were deeply
committed to the support of the Catholic Church, and that their
image in the community was distinctly Catholic. 93 With respect
to Western Maryland, the court found that that college had a strongly
Methodist image in the community, that many members of the
91. Id. at 966. The court in Simktna also referred to another somewhat related theory,
described below, supporting the idea that the actions of the two hospitals in question
constituted "state action"
Upon joining the program a participating State in effect assumes,
as a State function, the obligation of planning for adequate hospital care.
And it is, of course, clear that when a State function or responsibility is
being exercised, it matters not for Fourteenth Amendment purposes that
the * * * [institution actually chosen] would otherwise be private, the
equal protection guarantee applies. Id. at 968.
For a fuller discussion of the theories expounded by the court in
Sin ktips see Comment, Public Control of Sectarsan Institutions Receiving
Public Funds, 63 MicH. L. IREv. 142 (1964).
92. KAUPER, Op. cit. supra note 63, at 117.
93. 220 A.2d at 70-3.
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faculty and the student body were Methodists, that its charter re-
quired that more than one-third of the governing body be composed
of Methodist ministers (so that the clergy had a veto power with
respect to policy), and that the purpose of the college was to
" 'provide the best in higher education within the framework and
atmosphere of the verities and values of our Christian faith.' 94
(Emphasis in the court's opinion.) On the other hand, it was found
that Hood College was not controlled by a religious body, that the
faculty and student body represented a broad spectrum of religious
affiliation, that no efforts were made to proselytize, and that religion
did not play a dominant role in the college's program. 95
Considering these facts,96 one must admit that it would be dif-
ficult to distinguish between secular and religious instruction-at
least with respect to Notre Dame and St. Joseph. To a lesser extent
this is true with regard to Western Maryland. If the state of Mary-
land were to grant funds to Notre Dame, St. Joseph, and Western
Maryland, and if these grants were sustained against constitutional
attack, then the State of Maryland would be involved in providing
"direct" aid to institutions carrying on religious functions-with all
the concomitant restrictions upon religious activities which have
been discussed above.97
One may be tempted to quarrel with the decision of the court
that the grant to Western Maryland fell on the invalid side of the
94. Id. at 69.
95. Id. at 66-8.
96. The assumption which forms the basis of the conclusions reached by the author
of this article is that the facts, as found by the majority of the Maryland Court of
Appeals and as summarized above, cannot be ignored simply because one may regard
governmental aid to all church-related colleges and universities as desirable or perhaps
even essential. It is this assumption which provides a justification for the inclusion in
this article of a rather extended quotation from the majority opinion in the instant case.
And yet it must be admitted that courts may yield to the temptation to ignore these facts,
as is apparently illustrated by the following passage from the unreported opinion of
Judge Duckett, who wrote the opinion of the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County (the
trial court) in the instant case.
I must also admit that if I accept some of the exhibits and
publications of these two Catholic Institutions literally or at face value
that I would be inclined to hold that the receipt of these grants would
advance religion to a substantial degree. Some of these publications are,
for example, (1st) a chart of Notre Dame dated November, 1959, showing
that the core or center of all education at that Institution is philosophy
and theology from which branches all secular subjects, such as science
and mathematics (2nd) statments appearing in the catalogue of both
Colleges to the effect that the Institutions are for the education of
Catholics only and (3rd) the general statements in the publication to the
effect that religion Is primary, permeating all study, thereby making
education secondary.
While the above may have been the objectives and the desire of many
of the devout founders and leaders of these Institutions, I do not find
that they exist at this time. Even the stated objectives of the Institutions
In their charters must give way to the situation as actually existing. The
buildings sought to be constructed are for secular purposes and the testi-
mony In this case clearly establishes that the secular courses, such as
science, English and mathematics, taught in these Institutions are prac-
tically identical with the courses at non-religious colleges.
Quoted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix B, p. 89a.
97. Supra p. 683.
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line. Certainly it is true that religion did not appear to play quite
as prominent a role in the lives of students at Western Maryland
as it apparently did at Notre Dame and St. Joseph and that dif-
ferences between Western Maryland and Hood were not very great;
nevertheless, the factual recitations set forth above suggest that
differences did exist between the situations at Western Maryland
and Hood and that the decision of the Maryland court cannot be
regarded as entirely unreasonable. The drawing of this line-like
the drawing of most lines-is difficult, and in such a situation it
is almost always possible to urge that the line should have been
drawn somewhat differently
It must also be kept in mind, as suggested above, 8 that govern-
mental aid to institutions operating simultaneously in religious as
well as in secular capacities has an inherently coercive effect upon
other persons and institutions not so aided. This appears to be the
rationale of the Supreme Court decisions in the cases in which it
invalidated the reading of a "nonsectarian prayer"9 9 and the read-
ing of excerpts from the Bible in the public schools. 00
If governmental grants to these "sectarian" colleges are invalid,
can such grants to church-related hospitals logically be sustained?
The Maryland court said yes in Truitt,10' as did the United States
Supreme Court in Bradfield v Roberts (1899) 102 In the Bradfield
case, the Supreme Court upheld the granting of funds to a hospital
incorporated under an act of Congress and run by an order of the
Roman Catholic Church. The following passage from Mr Justice
Peckham's opinion for the Court is of interest:
There is no allegation that its hospital work is confined
to members of that church or that in its management the
hospital has been conducted so as to violate its charter in the
smallest degree. It is simply the case of a secular corporation
being managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are managing
the corporation according to the law under which it exists. 0 3
Thus, there was no evidence that the hospital was performing func-
tions of a distinctly religious nature. There was a similar absence
98. Supra, p. 683.
99. "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is [sic] placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorit-
ies to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Black (for the
court), Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 431.
100. The language set forth In footnote 99 was quoted approvingly by Mr. Justice
Clark, speaking for the Court in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 321.
101. 243 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966), cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 36 (1966).
102. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
103. Id. at 298-99.
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of such evidence in the case decided by the Maryland Court of
Appeals. 1 '
Tax exemptions for property held for religious purposes are also
distinguishable from grants to "sectarian" colleges. There is, as a
practical matter, less chance that governmental restrictions will
accompany such exemptions; hence, there is less of a threat of
interference with the exercise of religious liberty Also, because
such aid is less "direct" than that involved in the granting of funds,
the degree of governmental approbation of specific religious prac-
tices is less; hence, it is not as likely that those not aided will feel
pressures to conform-i.e., to affiliate with some groups which are
aided through tax exemption. Once again one is confronted with
differences of degree; perhaps, m view of these differences of de-
gree, the Maryland court's distinctions are reasonable ones.
There is a further question which deserves consideration. Is the
State of Maryland violating the right of certain Catholics and Meth-
odists to worship freely by refusing to grant aid to Notre Dame,
St. Joseph, and Western Maryland? (In the more traditional scheme
of analysis the question might be put in terms of whether the appli-
cation of the Free Exercise Clause here conflicts with the application
of the Establishment Clause.) Actually, this form of question is
slightly misleading, since there is no question that Catholics and
Methodists are perfectly free to worship in Maryland, just as they
are elsewhere. The question is whether a state can subsidize all
education at the college level except that which involves the per-
meation of religious doctrine. Obviously this is a form of discrim-
ination; the question, however, is whether this is a valid form
of discrimination. (The Equal Protection Clause, of course, does
not forbid all discriminations.) °5 If federal aid which is generally
available to all hospitals, for example, may be withheld because of
the failure of hospital administrators to treat all patients alike re-
gardless of race,106 why may not state or federal aid which is
generally available to all colleges be withheld from those colleges
which, in effect, espouse a particular creed in preference to other
104. Although each of the hospitals maintained a chapel, and although only Catholic
services could be performed in one of these chapels, none of the hospitals made any
'attempt to promote a particular religious. belief or religious belief in general
among the patients, or to influence their religious beliefs In any way. " 221 A.2d at 377.
Moreover, the court found that each of the hospitals had "a completely nonsectarian
policy with regard both to the admission and treatment of patients and the hiring of
all personnel." Id. at 375-76.
105. "The mere fact that the law results In treating some groups differently from
others does not, of course, automatically amount to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. To bar a State from drawing any distinctions in the application of its laws will
practically paralyze the regulatory power of legislative bodies." Black (dissenting), Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672-73 (1966).
106. "A detailed questionnaire was circulated asking hospitals the number of Negroes
and whites in their rooms and on their staffs, and whether all facilities were routinely
used by both races.
"Hospitals whose replies indicated discrimination, or against whom there had been
complaints - some 2,500 - had to undergo field inspection before they could be certified
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creeds? In each case, a government-either state or federal-with-
holds aid because the prospective recipient has acted in a manner
contrary to a principle contained in the federal constitution; in the
case of the aid to hospitals, the principle is that of racial equality, 10 7
while in the case of aid to colleges the principle is that of freedom
to worship' 0S-a freedom which is restricted by coercion resulting
from attempts at proselytization.
As discussed above,109 the principle upon which the instant case
was decided would, presumably, lead to the conclusion that other
"direct" aids to church-affiliated schools which can be described
as "sectarian" (within the standards set forth in the instant case)
are invalid. For example, payments to such schools for the cost
of lunches for school children1 0 would be indistinguishable from the
sort of aid attempted in the instant case; that is, the extent of
governmental involvement would be the same, as would be the
danger of concomitant governmental restrictions upon religious lib-
erty On the other hand, it might still be possible to provide aid
directly to individuals, as in the case of the present G.I. Bill.",'
It is still unlikely that the Supreme Court would go so far as to say
that the mere receipt of governmental aid by an individual, as
opposed to an organization, would be sufficient to constitute that
individual an instrumentality of the government; hence, the re-
strictions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would not apply
to actions of the individual.
It thus appears that the price of religious liberty is often incon-
venience for some and actual financial hardship for others. Persons
are free to believe anything and to worship freely so long as that
worship does not consist of acts which a society may properly regard
as detrimental to good public order 112 Such persons, however, have
no right to ask government to aid in the maintenance of membership
of the religious body or in the recruitment of new members for
eligible for Medicare. (There was no check to see if hospitals had lied in filling out the
questionnaire, a federal crime officials say that violators will be caught in routine
inspections.) Hospitals which resisted all pressure to comply were set down for suspension
of the 50-odd programs of federal hospital aid - a much tougher sanction than simply
denial of Medicare.
"HEW Is still working to bring recalcitrants into line and has begun
the process of cutting all federal aid to some " Drew, With-holding Money From
Hospitals That Segregate, 155 NEW REPUBLIC 11, 12 (1966).
The authority for withholding such aid is contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (supra, note 89), as implemented in 45 CFR 80.1-80.13 (1966 Supp).
107. " nor deny to any person within its Jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1.
108. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establisment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise of " U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
109. Supra, p. 669.
110. National School Lunch Act, 60 STAT. 230 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1964).
111. Veteran's Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 80 STAT. 12, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1651
(1966 Supp.).
112. Of course, conduct such as bigamy, which society punishes because of factors
unrelated to any particular religious doctrine, will not be excused merely because it Is
sanctioned by the religious belief of a particular sect. Reynolds V. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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that body If religious groups wish to combine secular and religious
education, that is their right; they cannot expect the government to
assist them, however
One can conclude, therefore, that the decision of the Maryland
court can be justified in spite of the court's own apparent uncertainty
regarding the theoretical basis of the decision. Since the Maryland
court had to follow the United States Supreme Court cases, and
since these latter cases contain references to several not entirely
consistent theories, the Maryland court can hardly be regarded as
the author of this confusion. The line which the Maryland court has
drawn can be viewed as one reasonably calculated to preserve the
religious freedom which both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment were intended to protect.

